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ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
While the court viewed this privilege as 
necessary to maintain the quality and in-
dependence of agency decision-making, it 
ordered the disclosure of the three docu-
ments on remand unless the Air Force 
could meet its burden by sufficient dem-
onstration of the applicability of the priv-
ilege to this situation. Agreeing that the 
documents were products of the attorney-
client relationship, the court, however, 
refused to hold them exempt under the 
privilege absent a showing by the Air 
Force that one document was confidential 
in itself and that two others were based on 
confidential information provided by the 
client. In the first case, one document 
sought to be withheld was known and dis-
closed to parties outside of the attorney-
client relationship (West Publishing Co.); 
as to the other two the Air Force sought 
to protect under the privilege theory, it 
was found that they were not based on in-
formation "supplied by the Air Force with 
the expectation of secrecy." Id. at 14-18. 
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGE 
(Internal Memoranda) 
This privilege turns on the distinction 
between information which is essentially 
factual and documents involving delibera-
tion and policy-making. The Supreme 
Court held that the former requires dis-
closure, EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 72 
(1973), while documents revealing agen-
cy policy making and deliberative pro-
cesses may be withheld. Id. at 19-20. 
Of the four documents the Air Force 
sought to withhold under this privilege, 
one was found to be exempt from dis-
closure. As to two others, the court stated 
that its policy of "promoting the free flow 
of ideas" protected from disclosure those 
parts of the documents reflecting the 
opinions of Air Force employees concern-
ing the status of negotiations with West. 
Slip op. at 22. The court found that the 
fourth document, dealing with various 
offers and counter-offers by both West 
and the Air Force, was not exempt simply 
because it reflected "negotiating posi-
tions" prior to a final contract. While such 
deliberations within an agency structure 
are protected, those involving an outside 
party are not. The court remanded to 
compel disclosure of this document and 
any parts of the others dealing with 
specific negotiations with West. Id. at 
22-24. 
SEGREGABILITY 
The court went on to hold that the Air 
Force had not adequately justified its 
claim that the requested documents con-
tained no non-exempt information that 
could be ·"reasonably segregable" from 
that information the Air Force asserted to 
be privileged under exemption five. The 
court further directed that an agency is re-
quired to provide an adequate description 
of a document's content and its reasons 
for belieVing the information to be non-
segregable before refUSing to disclose. Id. 
at 2. 
"The focus of the FOIA is information, 
not documents, and an agency cannot 
justify withholding an entire document 
simply by showing it contains some ex-
empt material." Slip op. at 27-28. 
On remand, the Air Force was ordered 
to provide a detailed justification for with-
holding the seven documents. In addition, 
the court stated that a further requirement 
of a party asserting that the information in 
a document was not segregable from ex-
empted information is a description of the 
portion of information contained in a file 
that is non-exempt and how that informa-
tion is dispersed throughout the entire 
document. The court reasoned that this 
information would better enable a court 
to establish the validity of an agency's 
assertion that non-privileged information 
was not segregable from that which was 
exempt. Id. at 29-30, 34. 
A narrow construction of exemption 
five places it in its proper context. For the 
attorney-client privilege to possess any 
gravity it must be circumscribed to pro-
tect communication between the lawyer 
and her client which is made with reliance 
on secrecy. The expectation of confiden-
tiality is often a condition precedent to 
any communication at all. Where parties' 
deliberations are protected to permit the 
"free flow of ideas" without threat of dis-
closure, opinion making and discussion 
flourishes. In the agency milieu, however, 
that crucial expectation of confidentiality 
is limited. Where attorney-client con-
sultations demand secrecy in order to 
meet an objective, and where administra-
tive deliberations must be confidential to 
avoid a chill on the "free flow of ideas," 
the exemption shall apply. Not intended 
by the Congress was protection of the 
mundane communication within the agen-
cy context, information necessarily sub-
ject to examination by third parties or the 
frustration of the public's reasonable right 




by John Jeffrey Ross 
John Lee McKnight was arrested and 
accused of committing four robberies 
within the same area of Baltimore during 
a single month in 1974. After an unsuc-
cessful motion to sever the informations 
joined in a single prosecution under Mary-
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land Rule 734 (now Rule 745A), 
McKnight was convicted. on five counts in 
all and the Court of Special Appeals 
affirmed. McKnight v. State, 33 Md. App. 
280, 364A.2d 116 (1976). Even though 
evidence on each information would not 
be admissible in a separate trial of 
another, the Court upheld joinder because 
of the "similarity of circumstances and of 
the conduct of" McKnight in the alleged 
offenses. 33 Md. App. at 285-86, 364 
A.2d at 119. See generally, Ross v. State, 
276 Md 664, 670, 350 A.2d 680, 684 
(1976); McCormick, Evidence sec. 190 
(2d Ed. 1972). 
After granting certiorari, the Court of 
Appeals reversed. McKnight v. State, 280 
Md. 604, 375 A.2d 552 (1977). 
The issues involved in the joinder or 
severance of indictments or charges dem-
onstrate an essential dichotomy between 
the rights of the people and those of the 
accused. 
As in pretrial release, for example, 
where the right to a reasonable oppor-
tunity for liberty of the defendant con-
flicts with the State's interest in protect-
ing the community (see 23 D.C. Code sec. 
1303-13), joinder of indictments in one 
prosecution for the sake of efficient ad-
ministration of justice collides with the 
prejudicial effects on a defendant facing a 
multiplicity of charges. 
In his appeal McKnight claimed that the 
charges were misjoined, resulting in sub-
stantial prejudice to his defense. Concern-
ing relief from prejudicial joinder, Rule 
735 (since the trial, Rule 735 has been 
superseded by Rule 745 (e)) relevantly 
provides: 
If it appears that an accused. . will 
be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
. in an indictment, or by joinder for 
trial together, the Court may order an 
election or separate trials of counts, 
. or provide such other relief justice 
requires. 
Rule 735 and its descendant, Rule 745 
(c), are based in the common law. 
McKnight, supra., 280 Md. at 608, 375 
A.2d at 554; DiNatale v. State, 8 Md. 
App. 455, 260 A.2d 669 (1970). Similar 
in tenor to Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, they provide for the 
application of judicial discretion to sever 
misjoined counts if necessary. 
~ THE FORUM 
There is considerable commentary on 
the problems of misjoining charges, 
especially the danger where the evidence 
necessary to prove each is mutually ex-
clusive. Joinder can be considered prej-
udicial per se. In Spencer v. Texas, 385 
U.S. 554, 653 (1967), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
All joint trials, whether of several code-
fendants or of one defendant charged 
with multiple offenses, furnish inherent 
opportunities for unfairness when evi-
dence submitted as to one crime . 
may influence the jury as to a totally 
different charge. 
See also 8 Moore's Federal Practice, ~ 
14.04(1); See generally, Walsh, Fair 
Trials and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 49 A.B.A.J. 853, 856-857 
(1963); 1 Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Sec. 223, p. 441 n. 32. Only 
when the interest in trial economy out-
weighs the prejudice to a defendant 
should a joinder be permitted. As Profes-
sor Wright notes, however, this balancing 
of interests is a dangerous practice to 
follow when a due process right is in-
volved. He states in his Federal Practice 
and Procedure in Sec. 141 at Pp. 
305-306: 
Justice and fairness should control over 
the demands of efficiency. Given the 
evident reluctance of trial and appellate 
courts to grant separate trials under 
Rule 14 [the pattern for Maryland Rule 
745 (e), McKnight, Supra, 280 Md at 
608, 375 A.2d at 554], a broad in-
terpretation of Rule 8 [Md Rule 745(a)] 
means broad joinder, whether or not 
this is just or fair. ***(I)t is a novel 
doctrine that the right of an accused to 
a fair trial can be balanced against com-
peting considerations of efficiency.***it 
seems strange indeed that one 
presumably innocent may be made to 
undergo something less than a fair trial, 
or that he may be prejudiced in his 
defense if the prejudice is "not substan-
tial", merely to serve the convenience 
of the prosecution. 
In noting the analogy between the 
Maryland and Federal rules in this regard, 
the Court of Appeals in McKnight listed as 
three possibilities for prejudice (articu-
lated in Drew v. United States, 11.8 U.S. 
App. D.C. 11, 14-15, 331 F.2d 85,88-89 
(1964)): 1) potential to embarrass or con-
found the defense; 2) the danger that "the 
jury may cumulate the evidence of the 
various crimes charged and find guilt 
when, if the offenses were considered sep-
arately, it would not do" so and 3) the 
jury may incorrectly, from evidence of 
one charge, make an unfair inference of 
criminal disposition in another. 280 Md. 
at 609, 375 A.2d at 554-555. See, Sim-
mons v. State, 165 Md. 155, 165-166, 
167 A.60, 64 (1933). 
The court pointed to two lines of 
authority on relief from prejudicial joinder 
when the evidence as to each offense 
would not be mutually admissible at sepa-
rate trials. The first rule allows joinder of 
offenses when the government can pre-
sent its case(s) without confUSing the jury. 
It is theorized that a clear and distinct pre-
sentation of each count at trial will result 
in a separate jury consideration of each. 
This is eminently unrealistic and therefore 
the court followed the more stringent 
theory that "a severance should be or-
dered where there has been a joinder of 
similar but unrelated offenses, if the evi-
dence as to each crime would not be 
mutually admissible at separate trials." 
280 Md at 610, 375 A.2d at 555. The 
court thus joins the Fourth circuit in not-
ing there is the potential for a serious 
misapplication by the jury of a finding of 
guilt on one charge as probative of a de-
fendant's guilt on another. This danger 
may occur even when the jury is pre-
sented with "Simple and Distinct" 
charges. 280 Md. at 611, 375 A.2d at 
555; United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 
733, 738 n.5 (4th Cir. 1976). 
In addition to rejecting the Govern-
ment's contention, which the Court of 
Special Appeals sanctioned, that the 
offenses were so identical in nature as to 
point to one man as their author the court 
saw no merit in the fact that the trial 
judge gave instructions designed to cau-
tion the jury to consider each charge sepa-
rately. McKnight, 280 Md. at 615, 375 
A.2d at 557. Instructions simply cannot 
overcome prejudice. The jury cannot 
erase its memory as it proceeds to con-
sider each separated offense. 
As Justice Jackson stated in a cele-
brated passage from Krulewitch v. United 
States, 336 U.s. 440, 453 (1949): "The 
naive assumption that prejudicial effects 
can be overcome by instructions to the 
jury . all practicing lawyers know to 
be unmitigated fiction." 
